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Since the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment as a progressive mandate that draws its meaning from "the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society. " In applying this standard, the Court looks to such objective
considerations as legislative enactments, patterns of jury decision
making, and international opinion as measures of contemporary values.
At the same time, the Court intermittently invokes its "own judgment" as
an independent gauge of constitutionality. This article assesses the
viability of the "evolving standards" doctrine, concluding that, as
presently conceived, it has produced an incoherent Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. In particular, by relying on majoritarian factors as a test
of constitutionality, the Court has misconceived the nature and
significance of a constitutional right. For in its zeal to avoid the charge
that the subjective policy preferences of individual justices drive its
decision making, the Court has embraced a form of moral skepticism that
is inconsistent with the history and character of the Constitution.
Despite the Court's missteps, the evolving standards formulation is
worth preserving because it highlights a number of important liberal-
democratic values. According to this alternative conception, the
touchstone of Eighth Amendment analysis is neither political popularity
nor personal morality but the political morality of our liberal
democracy-the best account of how our political values should shape
and constrain the institution ofpunishment.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a series of high-profile decisions beginning in 2002, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the Eighth Amendment' to forbid application of the death penalty to
mentally retarded offenders, 2 to sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders, 3 and to
* Professor of Law, Arizona State University Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law. I am
grateful to Jeffrie Murphy, Richard Dagger, and Christopher Bennett for helpful comments on an
earlier draft.
I U.S. CONST. amend. VHI ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
2 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005).
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child rapists who do not also kill their victims.4 Most recently, the Court has held
that sentencing juvenile offenders to a term of life without the possibility of parole
is also cruel and unusual for any offense short of homicide.5 While critics on and
off the Court have sought to highlight the shortcomings of the reasoning in these
cases, many welcome what they take to be a more progressive turn in the Court's
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. In particular, as the Court chips away at the
categories of offenders and offenses eligible for capital punishment, the
foundations for the most severe penalties may yet be undermined.
For those who believe that criminal sentences in the United States are unduly
harsh, it is natural to celebrate these developments. Trends in criminal justice
policy since at least the 1980s have otherwise consistently reflected a get-tough
approach that has dramatically increased the length of sentences for virtually all
offenses, especially for repeat offenders who run afoul of the popular "three-
strikes" provisions.8 Indeed, despite the handful of "progressive" decisions
regarding the death penalty and juvenile life sentences, the Court has generally
facilitated the trend toward severity in sentencing by deferring to legislative
judgments about the nature, purposes, and application of punishment.9
At the heart of these developments lies the Court's controversial approach to
determining what counts as "cruel and unusual" punishment. Throughout the
twentieth century and since, the Court has maintained that the Eighth Amendment
is not static but must "draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society."'o In applying this standard, the
Court looks to such "objective indicia" as legislative enactments, patterns of jury
decision making, and international opinion as measures of contemporary values."
Finally, it considers "its own independent judgment whether the punishment in
question violates the Constitution."' 2 In this way, the Court has sought to respect
the enlightened spirit of the Eighth Amendment while grounding its judgments in
objective criteria.
4 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2664-65 (2008).
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010).
6 See discussion infra Part III.
7 Sara F. Werboff, Halting the Sudden Descent into Brutality: How Kennedy v. Louisiana
Presents a More Restrained Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 1601, 1644-
45 (2010); John D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria's Vision: The Enlightenment, America's Death
Penalty, and the Abolition Movement, 4 Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 195, 321-22 (2009).
8 See MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABoUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN AMERICAN
PENAL CULTURE 8-9 (2004).
9 See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 29-30 (2003) (deferring to the California
legislature's enactment of a "three strikes" law); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73, 76-77 (2003)
(noting criminal sentences are only cruel and unusual under a proportionality test in "exceedingly
rare" and "extreme" cases while upholding a criminal sentence under a state "three strikes" law).
10 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
" Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561-63 (2005).
12 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2010).
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Despite these worthy aims, the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is
woefully misconceived. Its reliance on objective measures of contemporary values
stacks the deck in favor of majoritarian outcomes and is thus at odds with the
nature and significance of a constitutional right. Moreover, where outcomes have
deviated from majority preference, they seem ad hoc, giving rise to the suspicion
that they reflect nothing so much as the justices' personal policy preferences-in
the guise of the Court's own judgment or the weight of international opinion. The
resulting doctrine is at once both insufficiently protective of the rights of criminal
offenders and largely devoid of meaningful standards for justifying-or even
evaluating-the Court's controversial judgments.
What is the alternative? Some critics of the Court's "evolving standards"
analysis deny altogether the relevance of contemporary values to Eighth
Amendment interpretation.' 3  From this originalist perspective, the Court should
focus not on prevailing state practice or international opinion but on the historical
sources and context of the prohibition on "cruel and unusual" punishment. Others
have argued that the Court's assessment of prevailing public sentiment is
misleading because popular support for harsh penalties is uninformed by the actual
operation of the justice system.14 On this view, many people would withdraw their
support for the death penalty and other harsh punishments if they understood how
the system actually works.'5 Finally, some observers see in the Court's Eighth
Amendment decisions simple politics-the personal policy preferences of
particular justices or their rough-and-ready sense of the public mood.16
While these accounts point to various limitations in the Court's Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, I argue that the "evolving standards of decency"
formulation highlights important liberal-democratic values and is thus worth
13 See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 608 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing as "wrong" the
Court's reliance on "evolving standards" and evidence of a "national consensus"); John F. Stinneford,
The Original Meaning of "Unusual": The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1739, 1746 (2008) (advocating that Eighth Amendment interpretation focus on "unusual"
punishments as determined with reference to "longstanding traditions").
14 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 363 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("I
believe that the great mass of citizens would conclude on the basis of the material already considered
that the death penalty is immoral and therefore unconstitutional."); Carol S. Steiker, The Marshall
Hypothesis Revisited, 52 How. L.J. 525 (2009) (defending, despite her own initial misgivings,
Marshall's hypothesis that an informed public would turn against the death penalty).
15 See supra note 14.
16 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 338 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Seldom has an
opinion of this Court rested so obviously upon nothing but the personal views of its Members.");
Heidi M. Hurd, Death to Rapists: A Comment on Kennedy v. Louisiana, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 351,
363 (2008) ("[O]ne cannot help but suspect at the end of the day that it is the Court's core conviction
that death is undeserved by anyone who does not cause death that best explains the Court's
decision."); Corinna Barrett Lain, Lessons Learned from the Evolution of "Evolving Standards," 4
CHARLESTON L. REv. 661, 675 (2010) ("On both ends of the ideological spectrum, the [j]ustices'
policy preferences are strong and rigid, and neither the law nor anything else is likely to make a
dent."); id. at 676-77 (noting that "moderate" justices are "highly responsive to changes in public
opinion on salient issues like the death penalty").
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preserving. For although the prohibition on cruel excess establishes what is
forbidden in punishment, it is the commitment to decency that reminds us what is
required. By the same token, reference to the "progress of a maturing society"
signals that the standard is aspirational, exhorting us to resist inhumanity in
criminal punishment. Taken together, these considerations suggest a moral
framework for Eighth Amendment analysis. The touchstone is neither political
popularity nor personal morality but the political morality of our liberal
democracy-the best account of how our political values should shape and
constrain the institution of criminal punishment.17
To make this case, I begin by reviewing the Court's Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, focusing on the development of the evolving standards test in the
twentieth century. Before then, the Court had little occasion to interpret the
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment; once it did, it rejected the notion that
its meaning was fixed by eighteenth-century conceptions of cruelty.' 8 This set the
stage for the evolving standards test that dominates modem Eighth Amendment
analysis. The central failing of this approach is the determination that in order to
be objective, a standard must be quantifiable or otherwise uncontroversially
measurable. This has led the Court to overvalue majority opinion while neglecting
more relevant considerations. In particular, by treating evolving standards as an
empirical rather than a normative test, the Court obscures the moral dimension of
its own analysis. The resulting doctrine lacks coherence and legitimacy, producing
outcomes that are unjust-or at least unwarranted by the Court's stated rationale.
Whether we lament or celebrate particular Eighth Amendment decisions, we
should be deeply troubled by the process that produces them.
In place of its specious reliance on "objective indicia" of contemporary
values, the Court must develop greater confidence in its "own judgment." Serious
attention to the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society" will engage the Court in a rigorous moral analysis of what it
means to stand against cruelty in punishment and insist on decent treatment for
criminal wrongdoers. This will require the Court to shed its moral skepticism-the
implausible view, implicit in much of its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, that
morality is inherently subjective, the pursuit of moral truth necessarily futile. For,
despite the allure of the skeptical posture, it is out of place in our political morality.
The alternative analytical framework will not produce unassailable Eighth
Amendment decisions; nor will it be possible to know in advance what specific
outcomes it will yield. But an Eighth Amendment jurisprudence grounded in our
political morality provides the basis for evaluating even controversial judgments
by establishing the relevant terms of the debate. To that end, I will sketch what I
17 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 260-61 (1986) (defending a role for political
morality in constitutional interpretation and rejecting the charge that it is subjective).
18 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (adopting "progressive" interpretation
of the Eighth Amendment); Lain, supra note 16, at 664-65 (noting the small number of Eighth
Amendment cases prior to the 1970s).
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take to be the general contours of our political morality based on a recognition of
the equal moral worth of persons as a status inherent in our humanity. In the
context of punishment, this requires a rejection of cruelty and a commitment to
decency in the treatment of criminal offenders. Thus, "[t]he basic concept
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man."' 9
Accordingly, Eighth Amendment analysis should reflect the kind of people we
are-or aspire to be-and the treatment of offenders that entails, calling offenders
to account without displaying the vice of cruelty characteristic of the offenses
themselves.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF "EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY"
In its earliest interpretations of the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court
adopted the view that the prohibition on "cruel and unusual" punishment was
specifically intended to forbid the infliction of torture as a form of punishment in
the United States. Relying on the Framers' understanding of the identical language
in the English Declaration of Rights of 1689, the Court concluded that
"punishments of torture .. . and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty,
are forbidden by that [A]mendment to the Constitution."2 o In retrospect, it is
unclear whether the Framers' understanding of the English provision was
historically accurate. 21 But in any case, because the infliction of such torturous
punishments as "burning at the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the wheel, or the
like" 22 were not used in America, the Court's torture-based interpretation
effectively rendered the Eighth Amendment a nullity.
In 1910, however, the Court revisited its earlier analysis. In Weems v. United
23States, it considered an Eighth Amendment challenge to a sentence of fifteen
years at hard labor while chained at the ankle and wrists for the crime of falsifying
a public document.24  The Court noted the English source of the "cruel and
unusual" formulation but concluded that its application must be broader in scope
"than the mischief which gave it birth." 25 For surely the Framers "intended more
than to register a fear of the forms of abuse that went out of practice with the
Stuarts."26  After canvassing various interpretations of the Clause, the Court
insisted that the Eighth Amendment "is not fastened to the obsolete but may
acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice."27
19 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
20 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1879).
21 See Lain, supra note 16, at 664-65 (discussing historical evidence of Framers' confusion).
22 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890).
23 217 U.S. at 349.
24 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 362-64 (1910).
25 Id. at 373.
26 Id. at 372.
27 Id. at 378.
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Finally, the Court contrasted the challenged sentence with the lighter sentences
available for more serious offenses such as treason, murder, and rebellion,
concluding that Weems's sentence was indeed cruel and unusual, for it
"exhibit[ed] a difference between unrestrained power and that which is exercised
under the spirit of constitutional limitations formed to establish justice."28
With Weems, the Court not only broadened the scope of Eighth Amendment
analysis to include considerations of proportionality; it explicitly rejected
eighteenth- (and seventeenth-) century conceptions of cruelty as a basis for Eighth
Amendment analysis. Thus, in addition to torturous punishments-those which
were "inhuman and barbarous" in themselveS2 9-the Eighth Amendment was taken
to forbid otherwise legitimate punishments deemed grossly excessive in relation to
the crime.
In 1958, the Court in Trop v. Dulles wholeheartedly embraced this conception
of the Eighth Amendment in the course of invalidating a sentence of expatriation-
rendering an American-born citizen effectively stateless-for the crime of war-
time desertion.30 Indeed, although the analysis in Trop harkens back to a more
traditional Eighth Amendment conception-involving a claim that the punishment
was itself unusually cruel-the Court seemed to go out of its way to reiterate its
commitment to a progressive reading of the prohibition. Following Weems, the
Court affirmed that because "the words of the Amendment are not precise," their
"scope is not static."3 ' Instead, the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."3 2 In Trop, this meant that while expatriation did not constitute torture in
the traditional sense of physical brutality, it amounted to "a form of punishment
more primitive than torture," "destroy[ing] for the individual the political existence
that was centuries in the development." 33  In this way, expatriation was
inconsistent with the underlying principle of the Eighth Amendment-"nothing
less than the dignity of man"34-as well as the consensus of civilized nations.35
While Weems and Trop set the stage for modem Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, it was the plurality decision in Gregg v. Georgia36 in 1976 that
established the prevailing test for determining whether a sentence or punishment is
cruel and unusual. In Gregg, the Court effectively reinstated the death penalty in
the United States after declaring it unconstitutional only four years earlier in
28 Id. at 381.
29 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890).
30 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
31 Id. at 100-0 1.
2 Id. at 101.
3 Id.
Id. at 100.
3 Id. at 102.
36 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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Furman v. Georgia.3 7  To reach this result, the Court not only evaluated the
statutory provisions that responded to the constitutional infirmities identified in
Furman; it also invoked and strengthened its commitment to the "evolving
standards of decency." In particular, the Court insisted that the measure of
evolving standards lies in an "assessment of contemporary values concerning the
infliction of a challenged sanction."38 Thus, trends in legislation and patterns of
jury decision making would provide the relevant "objective indicia" of
contemporary public sentiment. 3 9  Finally, the Court noted its responsibility to
exercise independent judgment to ensure that the punishment is consistent with
"'the dignity of man."AO
Since Gregg, the Court has deployed essentially this formula in evaluating a
range of issues, including the constitutionality of capital punishment for insane,
mentally retarded, and teenage offenders, and for offenders who commit non-fatal
rapes; also in assessing the permissibility of life sentences for non-violent repeat
offenders and for teenagers convicted of non-homicide offenses.4 1 In all of these
cases, the Court has relied on the evolving standards test to determine whether a
sentence or punishment is cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. Indeed, in some cases the Court has invoked evolving standards to
justify upholding a challenged punishment, only to reverse course and invalidate
42the same punishment under the same standard a relatively short time later. In
recent years, the Court has seemed especially receptive to arguments that for
certain classes of offenders, harsh punishments, such as the death penalty or life
sentences without the possibility of parole, are inconsistent with evolving
1 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam). In Furman, the Court invalidated the death
penalty in the United States based on a determination that its infliction constituted cruel and unusual
punishment because its application was arbitrary and capricious. Id. Although two of the justices
concurring in the Court's judgment invoked "evolving standards" as a basis for concluding that
capital punishment is inherently cruel and unusual, the test did not play a decisive role in the outcome
of the case. Id. at 269 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring).
3 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
39 id.
4 Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).
41 See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010) (teens, non-homicide); Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2649 (2008) (non-fatal rape of child); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
561, 578-79 (2005) (sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003)
(non-violent recidivists; for complicated procedural reasons, the Ewing Court did not explicitly
invoke "evolving standards" but relied on a line of cases that did); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
311-12 (2002) (mentally retarded); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) (insane); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 603 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (non-fatal rape).
42 Compare Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989) (declining to hold that execution of
mentally retarded offenders is unconstitutional), with Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (holding that capital
punishment is unconstitutional for mentally retarded offenders); compare Stanford v. Kentucky, 492
U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (upholding death penalty for sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders), with
Roper, 543 U.S. at 578-79 (deeming such sentences unconstitutional).
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standards of decency. In these cases, it has emphasized national and international
consensus, including the views of professional associations and interest groups, as
well as the exercise of its own considered judgment.4 3
III. "OBJECTIVE INDICIA" OF EVOLVING STANDARDS
In addition to disagreements about the substantive outcomes in these cases,
critics have sought to identify flaws in the Court's method of calculating national
consensus, deny the relevance of international opinion, and reject any role for the
Court's "own judgment."" Others have focused on the incoherence of defining a
constitutional right-a right of the individual against the majority-in terms of that
majority's preferences. 45 After briefly reviewing the "counting" controversies, I
will consider this resort to majoritarianism-the majoritarian trap-together with
the case against the Court's own judgment. This analysis exposes the illegitimacy
of the Court's current approach, which is based on a false choice between the
"objectivity" of majoritarian criteria and the "subjectivity" of individual judgment.
The result has been a set of decisions that may or may not be substantively
defensible, but that reflect, in any case, the systemic failure of the constitutional
process in Eighth Amendment decision making.
A. The Deceptive Simplicity of Counting
Among the objective indicia of society's contemporary values, determining
the number of legislative enactments for and against a practice would seem to be
the most straightforward. Simply count the number of states that support a penal
practice and the number that do not; the result will be a percentage suggesting the
degree to which the practice is consistent with contemporary values.46 The first
problem with this simple mathematical calculation is that no one can agree on the
relevant data. In the death penalty context, for example, it is unclear whether the
twelve states that prohibit the death penalty under all circumstances should count
toward the number of states that reject the death penalty for particular offenders or
43 See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 575-76 (noting that international opinion supported the
Court's invalidation of the death penalty for minors); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (noting the views
of professional organizations that urged the Court to invalidate the use of the death penalty for
mentally retarded offenders).
4 See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 608-11 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
45 See, e.g., Hurd, supra note 16, at 356; Lain, supra note 16, at 662 n.4-5 (collecting
sources); see also infra Part III.B.
4 The Court also typically includes federal law in calculating numerical support for a
practice. In at least one case, this led to further confusion when the Court failed to take account of a
military policy that might have lent needed support to a challenged-and ultimately invalidated-
practice. See Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2653 n.* (noting that the Court failed to take account of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice in determining that a death sentence is disproportionate to the crime
of child rape based on national consensus).
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offenses. As Justice Scalia has argued, these states will not have considered the
specific issues relevant to determining the applicability to particular sub-
populations-to teenagers, for example.47 "That [twelve] [s]tates favor no
executions says something about consensus against the death penalty, but nothing.
. . about consensus that offenders under [eighteen] deserve special immunity from
such a penalty."AS On the other hand, their opposition to the use of the death
penalty in all cases establishes a fortiori their opposition to its application to
teenage offenders.
So who is right? The thing to see is that neither method is obviously or
uncontroversially correct. Determining whether non-death penalty states should be
part of the calculation would require reasoned argument about the nature of the
inquiry and the scope of relevant data. Although this does not mean that there is
no objective answer to the question about which states should count,49 it does
suggest that no method of decision making will allow the Court to avoid making
controversial judgments or mathematically prove the validity of its conclusions.
A similar problem arises with regard to the Court's reliance on patterns of
jury decision making. In Furman, Justice William Brennan highlighted the
relative infrequency of capital sentences and the persistent decline in its
application as evidence that "society seriously questions the appropriateness of this
punishment today."50 But as death penalty proponents have demonstrated, this
same evidence might equally support the conclusion that juries are exercising their
discretion responsibly, reserving the ultimate punishment for only the most
appropriate cases. Thus, perhaps the "selectivity of juries in imposing the
punishment of death is properly viewed as a refinement on, rather than a
repudiation of, the statutory authorization for that penalty."5' A careful parsing of
the data might be able to suggest which conclusion is more defensible, but it will
not uncontroversially resolve the dispute about the significance of jury decision
making.
The final factor among the Court's "objective indicia" of evolving
standards-international opinion-has become the most controversial.52 At least
since Trop, the Court has treated "the climate of international opinion" as "not
irrelevant" to its evolving standards analysis. 5 3  "The opinion of the world
community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and
47 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 611 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
48 Id; see also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-71 (1989) (calculating support based
on exclusion of non-death penalty jurisdictions).
49 See infra Part III.C.
so Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 299 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
51 Id. at 388 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
52 See, e.g., Youngjae Lee, International Consensus as Persuasive Authority in the Eighth
Amendment, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 63 (2007) (discussing controversy and collecting sources).
53 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977).
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significant confirmation for our own conclusions." According to critics,
however, international opinion or practice, no matter how consistent, can never
inform interpretation of the United States Constitution.ss On this view, it is absurd
to think that the Court would assess contemporary values by looking to countries
that have developed "a legal, political, and social culture quite different from our
own.,s Moreover, critics point to the Court's selectivity in invoking foreign
sources, citing it to "affirm" judgments it has reached on other grounds but
ignoring or distorting it when it departs from well-settled American values. As
before, the Court's reliance on foreign sources, far from providing a neutral source
of contemporary values, is likewise fraught with controversy.
B. The Majoritarian Trap
Beyond the various counting controversies that dog the Court's "objective
indicia" analysis, the fundamental problem with its Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence is the attempt to operationalize "evolving standards" in terms of
majoritarian preferences. As many commentators have noted, reliance on majority
preferences to determine the scope and application of a constitutional right vitiates
the protection afforded by that right.58 For "it makes no sense to employ the value
judgments of the majority as the vehicle for protecting minorities from the value
judgments of the majority., 59  This insight is easy enough to credit outside the
Eighth Amendment context, where its operation is axiomatic. Thus, free speech
doctrine is premised on the recognition that unpopular speakers are most in need of
protection from the inclination of the majority to silence them, because "if there is
any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than
54 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
ss See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("The plurality's reliance upon Amnesty International's account of what it pronounces to be civilized
standards of decency in other countries is totally inappropriate as a means of establishing the
fundamental beliefs of this Nation.") (citation omitted).
56 Roper, 543 U.S. at 627 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
51 Id. at 627 & n.9, 628.
58 See, e.g., Hurd, supra note 16, at 356 ("After all, if rights are at stake, why would it matter
how many people might want to trample them?"); Michael S. Moore, Morality in Eighth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 47, 63 (2008) ("It does not make sense to give a
majoritarian interpretation of minority rights against the majority."); Margaret Jane Radin, The
Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U.
PA. L. REv. 989, 1036 (1978) ("Constitutional doctrine may not be formulated by the acts of those
institutions which the Constitution is supposed to limit."); Stinneford, supra note 13, at 1754
("Because the evolving standards of decency test ties the meaning of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause to public opinion, the Eighth Amendment provides little protection when public
opinion becomes enflamed and more prone to cruelty.").
s9 JoHN HART ELY, DEMoCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JuDIcIAL REVtEw 69 (1980).
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any other it is the principle of free thought-not free thought for those who agree
with us but freedom for the thought that we hate."6 o
Consider, for example, a group of neo-Nazis proposing to stage a march to
promote their racial agenda, which a large majority of the community regards as
odious and offensive. They apply for a parade permit but are denied by local
officials who hope to prevent the march. If the Court determined to resolve the
matter of the marchers' rights by canvassing the permitting practices of officials in
similar cases, it might well discover that unpopular marchers are routinely denied
permits based on the offensiveness of their message. Were the Court to conclude
that the First Amendment protection therefore extends only to those popular
enough to gain a permit in the first place, it would render the right to free
expression effectively meaningless. However, it is well established that denying
the parade permit based on the unpopularity of the marchers or their message is
inconsistent with respect for their First Amendment rights.6
In the Eighth Amendment context, it is similarly objectionable to invoke
majority opinion-as reflected in legislation, jury verdicts, or international
opinion62-as a basis for determining the scope and content of the constitutional
right against cruel treatment. For obvious reasons, criminal offenders are among
the most despised members of any community. Moreover, as a general matter,
they lack the political power and influence to advance their legitimate interest in
decent treatment through ordinary political processes. The prohibition on cruel
treatment, like other Bill of Rights protections, is designed to safeguard the rights
of such powerless and unpopular minorities who might otherwise be left to the
mercy of a hostile majority." But an Eighth Amendment doctrine that links the
standard of cruelty to prevailing public attitudes provides the least protection from
cruel treatment to those who need it most.
In view of recent decisions that have favored offenders challenging harsh
sentences, the danger of defining rights protection with reference to public
attitudes may seem somewhat remote. Guided by "objective indicia," the Court
has managed to safeguard the rights of even those guilty of the most terrible
60 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
61 See, e.g., Nat'I Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977) (per curiam).
62 The weight of international opinion has actually tended to favor criminal offenders in the
Court's Eighth Amendment analysis. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005);
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 325 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 102-03 (1958). Of course this historical contingency does not render valid the Court's practice of
gauging popular opinion, international or otherwise, to determine whether a punishment is
unconstitutionally cruel.
63 See TONRY, supra note 8, at 15.
6 See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) ("The very purpose of a Bill
of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be
applied by the courts.").
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crimes. And if, as these developments suggest, majoritarian considerations are
consistent with a robust commitment to individual rights, then perhaps we should
not be so quick to reject the Court's analysis. If anything, in a democratic society,
we should be suspicious of standards that defy the popular will.66
Apart from the conceptual problem already identified, we should resist this
overly sanguine account of recent Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. First, the
right of criminal offenders to decent treatment is insecure to the extent that it
depends on prevailing public sentiment. In the death penalty context, for example,
Justice Thurgood Marshall's effort to reconcile majoritarian considerations with
the Court's independent duty to evaluate the practice illustrates the perils of linking
constitutional standards to public attitudes, no matter how ideally conceived. In
Furman, Marshall maintained that, despite popular support for the death penalty,
the relevant "question . . . is not whether a substantial proportion of American
citizens would today, if polled, opine that capital punishment is barbarously cruel,
but whether they would find it to be so in the light of all information presently
available."6 According to Marshall, were the public to learn certain facts about
the death penalty-the imbalance between its high social costs and low social
benefits together with the discriminatory and disruptive manner in which it is
applied-they would promptly turn against it.69 But, as Marshall was forced to
concede a short time later, greater exposure to the facts about capital punishment
coincided with renewed and enthusiastic public support for it.70 In the wake of
Furman, thirty-five states and the federal government enacted new death penalty
statutes; in California, voters overwhelmingly adopted a constitutional amendment
restoring the death penalty after it had been invalidated by the California Supreme
Court.7' As Justice O'Connor observed in a subsequent case, "any inference of a
societal consensus rejecting the death penalty [in 1972] would have been
mistaken." 72
65 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2646 (2008) (recounting Kennedy's
brutal rape of his eight-year-old stepdaughter); Roper, 543 U.S. at 556-57 (describing Roper's role in
the brutal and senseless murder of a woman); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 338 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting
that Atkins abducted, robbed, and murdered his victim, shooting him eight times).
6 See generally Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE
L.J. 1346 (2006) (arguing that judicial review of legislation is democratically illegitimate and, as a
general matter, unnecessary for safeguarding individual rights).
67 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 362 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
68 Id.
69 Id. at 362-63.
70 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 232 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I would be less
than candid if I did not acknowledge that these developments [i.e., post-Furman legislative support
for the death penalty] have a significant bearing on a realistic assessment of the moral acceptability of
the death penalty to the American people.").
71 See id. at 181.
72 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 855 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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A second problem with relying on recent offender-friendly decisions to
vindicate the Court's majoritarian approach is that the decisions themselves display
a degree of incoherence-between outcomes and their stated rationales-that
seriously undermines their viability. In Kennedy, for example, the recent decision
invalidating the death penalty for the non-fatal rape of a child, the Court invokes
both of the leading justifications for capital punishment-deterrence and
retribution-but seems unaware of the obvious tension between them.73
Meanwhile, it considers both the objective indicia analysis as well as its own
judgment, but never suggests whether or how the two are related or which takes
precedence in case of a conflict. Under these circumstances, it is impossible to
discern which values or considerations are doing the actual decision-making
work.74 In any case, the Court's failure to offer a satisfactory resolution of the
various counting controversies casts doubt on the claim of objectivity that purports
to legitimate its assessment of evolving standards.
In the face of these discrepancies, the Court has acknowledged the importance
of its "own judgment," but its efforts to articulate it have been unconvincing.
Indeed, because the Court has made so much of the distinction between its own
judgment and the objective indicia of contemporary standards, it has significantly
diminished its own credibility. In this way, the Court has left itself vulnerable to
the charge that when it exercises independent judgment it is substituting its
subjective policy preferences for objective constitutional analysis. In fact, because
neither the objective indicia nor its "own judgment" provide meaningful decision-
making guidance, the Court is adrift, generating seemingly ad hoc rationalizations
for outcomes reached, as far as anyone can tell, on the basis of its own political
agenda.
The Court has thus fallen into a trap of its own making, clinging to
majoritarian considerations that ostensibly provide objective standards in order to
minimize-or mask-reliance on its own subjective judgment. The result is an
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that lacks political legitimacy-not because it
incorporates the Court's own judgment, but because it fails to specify the actual
grounds of decision or provide a meaningful opportunity for critical evaluation of
* 75its reasoning.
73 See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2661 (2008) (noting "the two distinct social
purposes served by the death penalty: retribution and deterrence").
74 Hurd, supra note 16, at 357 (noting that the Court "embarks upon a disjointed and
meandering discussion of a laundry list of considerations, not all of which are compatible, many of
which are ill-conceived, and few of which appear appropriate to deciding whether death is a
constitutional response to child rape").
7 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 237 (1993) (noting the Supreme Court's role as an
"exemplar of public reason," which requires that it render and explain its decisions in terms of public
values).
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C. Moral Skepticism
Why has the Court become ensnared in this majoritarian trap? Several
familiar features of constitutional analysis have played a role, leading the Court to
adopt a form of moral skepticism that all but denies the possibility of objective
judgment in the face of moral controversy. First, it is well established that the
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, more obviously than most
constitutional guarantees, reflects an abstract moral principle. Once the Court
rejected a strict originalist account of the prohibition, it committed itself to the
proposition that the "standard of extreme cruelty is not merely descriptive, but
necessarily embodies a moral judgment."77 Whereas an originalist interpretation
would have limited application of the Amendment to forms of punishment
recognized as cruel and unusual by eighteenth-century standards, an independent
moral judgment necessarily involves a broader range of considerations.
The prospect of rendering such a judgment triggers the Court's sensitivity
about the nature and scope of its own role within a liberal-democratic polity. For
"in a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to the
will and consequently the moral values of the people."79 In the Eighth Amendment
context in particular, "the primacy of the legislative role narrowly confines the
scope ofjudicial inquiry."80 The alternative-defining the Amendment not "on the
basis of what [the Court] perceive[s] the society through its democratic processes
now overwhelmingly disapproves," but according to the Court's own judgment-
amounts to replacing "judges of the law with a committee of philosopher-kings."8 '
To avoid this form of democratic illegitimacy, the Court has consistently cast
the evolving standards analysis in terms of the objective indicia that keep their
personal policy preferences at bay. "Eighth Amendment judgments should not be,
or appear to be, merely the subjective views of individual [j]ustices; judgment
should be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent." 82
Indeed, despite disagreements among the justices about the role, if any, for the
Court's "own judgment," evolving standards analysis invariably focuses first on
legislation as the "clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary
values," 83 and only later, if at all, on its own judgment. In this way, the Court
seeks to deflect the charge that its Eighth Amendment decisions are merely "post
76 ANTONIN SCALA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 145
(1997).
7 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 382 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
78 SCALtA, supra note 76, at 145 (arguing that the meaning of the Eighth Amendment is
rooted in the eighteenth century).
7 Furman, 408 U.S. at 383 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
8 Id. at 384.
a Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 379 (1989) (plurality opinion).
82 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
83 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989).
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hoc rationalization[s] for the [Court's] subjectively preferred result rather than any
objective effort to ascertain the content of an evolving standard of decency."
Having framed Eighth Amendment analysis as a choice between objective
considerations that flow from democratic processes and the subjective preferences
of the unelected, unaccountable judiciary, the Court has left itself no meaningful
choice at all.
This unfortunate development in Eighth Amendment interpretation reflects a
more pervasive confusion about the nature of objectivity, its place in moral
analysis, and the operation of both in constitutional interpretation. Against a
backdrop of suspicion about the democratic legitimacy of an unelected judiciary,
the Court has developed a variety of mechanisms of deference and restraint
designed to circumscribe its role. In this spirit, it has embraced a crude form of
skepticism in Eighth Amendment interpretation predicated on the denial of an
objective morality. On this view, because moral truth does not exist or is, in any
case, unknowable, the enterprise of moral analysis is inherently futile. Further,
because moral values merely reflect the subjective preferences of those who hold
them, they cannot be proved (or disproved) or otherwise objectively justified.
Accordingly, it is illegitimate for the Court to invalidate legislative enactments
based on a judgment of moral error because there are no objective grounds to
prefer one moral claim to another. In a democratic society, then, the Court is
bound to defer to the will of the people about what counts as cruelty in punishment
lest it arrogate to itself the role of philosopher-kings.
Among the many problems with this skeptical account of Eighth Amendment
interpretation, perhaps the most glaring is its lack of fit with the broader
constitutional enterprise. In particular, skepticism is incompatible with the robust
commitment to natural rights that animated the Framers and their conception of the
judicial role. From the familiar reference to "unalienable rights" in the Declaration
of Independence to the specific guarantees in the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights, the Framers conceived of morality as an objective reality that predates-
and transcends-the institution of political society.8 6 A judiciary empowered to
police the boundaries between the limited power of government and the natural
rights of individuals follows "from the nature and reason" of the constitutional
design.87
8 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 322 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
85 See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLrICS (1962) (outlining and defending various devices by which the Court has
sought to retain its status as the least dangerous branch).
86 See generally MORTON WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1987) (tracing the Lockean natural law origins of the Framers' normative moral philosophy and
epistemology); see also Moore, supra note 58, at 55 ("[Ilf one is a moral realist-as Madison,
Hamilton, and Locke were-it follows that when judges are enjoined to make moral judgments, they
judge something that is not of their own creation.") (footnote omitted).
87 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 230 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1961)
(distinguishing between positive legislative enactments and rules of constitutional construction that
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In a modem pluralist society, however, the skeptical impulse springs
primarily from the fact of pervasive moral disagreement. Competing conceptions
of justice and the good (for example) fuel the suspicion that moral truth is simply
unavailable. If otherwise reasonable people cannot agree about what justice
requires or the good life entails, then we may be tempted to deny the possibility of
an objective account of the just and the good. In this way, moral inquiry compares
unfavorably with scientific inquiry, with its vaunted method for ascertaining and
verifying scientific facts. For if the measure of truth is replicability-generating
consistent results by systematically following standard procedures-then the
persistence of moral diversity stands as a testament to the futility of moral inquiry:
no consistency, no truth.
Despite its superficial plausibility, this analysis suffers from at least two
serious flaws. First, the fact of disagreement itself does not establish the absence
of a moral truth-of-the-matter. No matter how tempting it is to see disagreements
about abortion rights, wealth redistribution, or affirmative action as evidence of
moral indeterminacy, the fact of disagreement cannot, by itself, demonstrate that
skepticism is warranted.88  "Whether diversity of opinion in some intellectual
domain has skeptical implications depends on a further philosophical question: it
has such implications only if the best account of the content of that domain
explains why it should."89  In the absence of an argument establishing a causal
relationship between moral truth and moral opinions, the persistence of moral
disagreement does not justify the skeptical conclusion.
The familiar comparison with scientific inquiry, typically adduced to discredit
moral inquiry, is instructive in this respect but also has the potential to mislead.
For in the realm of science, we tend to overestimate the degree of consensus,
taking scientific agreement as conclusive evidence of scientific truth. But in fact,
our perception of scientific consensus is almost certainly exaggerated; most of us,
with regard to most scientific fields, simply lack the expertise to appreciate the
nature and extent of scientific controversy. 90 In any case, when we do encounter
derive "from the nature and reason of the thing"); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178
(1803) (noting that courts' determination as to whether legislative enactments are consistent with the
Constitution "is the very essence ofjudicial duty").
88 David Copp, Moral Skepticism, 62 PHIL. STUD. 203, 203 (1991) ("[I]t is entirely clear that
there is no sound argument from disagreement alone to any interesting form of skepticism."); Ronald
Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87, 113 (1996) ("[W]e
would not count the popularity of our moral opinions as evidence for their truth. Why should we
count their controversiality as evidence against it?").
89 Dworkin, supra note 88, at 113. Dworkin illustrates with an example, observing that we
might be justifiably skeptical if millions of people who claimed to have seen unicorns described
vastly different creatures. For "if there were unicorns, and people had seen them, the actual
properties of the beast would have caused more uniform reports. But when we have no such domain-
specific account of why diversity of opinion impeaches all opinion, we draw no skeptical conclusions
from that diversity." Id.
9 See JAMES RACHELS & STUART RACHELS, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 47 (5th
ed. 2007) (noting that complicated scientific questions generate considerable disagreement among
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disagreements in science-about evolution, for example, or astrophysics-it
generally does not cause us to deny that there is a fact of the matter about the
origins of life or of the universe. Instead, we yield to the stronger theory, the one
that better explains the phenomenon in question and accords with other well-
settled beliefs about which we are most confident. That others hold fast to the
contrary view-to creationism, for example-affects neither the truth of human
origins nor our confidence in the scientific method.9' Those who remain
unpersuaded by even the most compelling scientific theories may be stubborn or
ideological or moved by faith, but the fact of disagreement does not alter the fact
of the matter. 92
Another area of confusion in the Court's skeptical account is the assumption
that objectivity requires quantifiable or otherwise uncontroversial metrics. In the
Eighth Amendment context, this has led the Court to focus on certain sorts of
variables-the number of states, the frequency of jury verdicts, the weight of
international opinion-that can, in principle, be readily measured or counted.93 By
the same token, the Court has discounted as necessarily "subjective" a range of
morally relevant considerations that are not susceptible of being quantified. Thus,
scientists); Daniel McDermott, Analytical Political Philosophy, in POLITICAL THEORY: METHODS AND
APPROACHES 11, 24 (David Leopold & Marc Stears eds., 2008).
From the outside it may seem like scientists form a harmonious community, with
individual scientists unveiling new theories to the happy applause of their colleagues,
when the truth is that scientists often disagree profoundly about methods and results,
leading to disputes as bitter as any [you will] find in a humanities department.
Id.
91 See McDermott, supra note 90, at 21 ("I certainly wouldn't infer from the fact of our
disagreement that there is no truth of the matter about human origins, just differing opinions. Nor
would I allow this disagreement to undermine my confidence in scientific methods and tests.")
We can certainly imagine fields of scientific inquiry in which specialists are divided over the
best interpretation of the relevant data. In the face of such a live controversy, uncertainty may be
warranted. But uncertainty is distinct from indeterminacy. See Dworkin, supra note 88, at 130-31.
According to Dworkin, "[i]f I see arguments on all sides of some issue, and do not find, even after
reflection, one set of arguments stronger than the others, then I am entitled without more to declare
that I am uncertain." Id. at 131. By contrast, a "belief in indeterminacy is a positive claim, and it
needs a positive reason or assumption to support it." Id. Thus, indeterminacy-the affirmative view
that there is no answer to some moral question-cannot simply be true by default.
92 The comparison to the domain of science is misleading in another respect. In the context of
moral inquiry, we tend to focus on the most contentious issues-abortion, capital punishment, gay
rights. In science, lay people tend to be unaware of the numerous controversies and ill-equipped to
appreciate them in any case. See RACHELS & RACHELS, supra note 90, at 47. This is not to suggest
that science and morality are on equal footing, however. It remains the case that we can generally be
more confident about scientific theory than moral theory. As McDermott observes, the interplay
between human beings and their environment is such that our empirical judgments tend to be more
reliable than our normative judgments, resulting in greater convergence around scientific truths.
McDermott, supra note 90, at 23.
9 As the counting controversies suggest, even these "objective" criteria are subject to
considerable disagreement about the nature and significance of the relevant data. See supra Part
III.A.
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the Court has generally declined to render judgments about the precise nature of
moral concepts such as cruelty, decency, or dignity, or the manner and extent of
punishment they justify.
It is easy enough to see how the Court came to hold such a mistaken view. In
a variety of settings, we associate objectivity with decision making that does not
require individual judgment or discretion. Perhaps the most obvious example is
the machine-graded, multiple-choice exam, denominated "objective" and
contrasted with the essay exam, the "subjective" alternative. Although these labels
provide a useful shorthand for a familiar distinction, they perpetuate the confusion
about the nature of objectivity. Essay tests, to have any legitimacy, must also be
objective tests. As anyone who has graded (if not also those who have been
graded) can attest, evaluating an essay exam does not involve-or countenance-
subjective judgment. Thus, assigning grades based on such considerations as one's
mood, or preference for particular students, or aversion to certain font styles is
obviously illegitimate. For although grading essays requires the exercise of
judgment-about the student's mastery of material and the clarity and cogency of
argumentation, for example-conscientious grading requires the application of
consistent qualitative standards of substance and style. An experienced grader may
be able to operate without a formal list of such standards, but any conscientious
grader would be able to produce and defend such a list if necessary.
While the tendency to overvalue quantitative standards should not mislead us
into thinking that discretionary judgments are necessarily subjective, neither
should we deny the distinctive potential for abuse associated with such judgments.
Thus, while it would be obviously improper to grade an exam based on a student's
physical appearance, the opportunity for such an impropriety only meaningfully
arises in the context of discretionary decision making. Whereas a grading machine
can only take account of the programmed criteria based on the placement of
standard markings, a grading human may rely on an indeterminate mix of
permissible and impermissible criteria, whose influence he may not be able fully to
recognize or control. The potential for such abuse helps to explain the Court's
inclination to deemphasize its "own judgment" in Eighth Amendment analysis.
The problem with the Court's reticence in this context is that it effectively
disables itself from performing its constitutionally assigned role.94 As a matter of
constitutional design and institutional competence, the judiciary's singular strength
is the power of judgment.95 Insulated from the ordinary forces of electoral politics,
judges are meant to have and exercise independence sufficient "to guard the
Constitution and the rights of individuals," especially the rights of minorities
against majority oppression. To the extent that the judiciary refuses to exercise
9 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 87, at 228 (Alexander Hamilton).
9s See id. (noting that the judiciary is insulated from the majoritarian forces that dominate
electoral politics and exercises only the power ofjudgment).
9 Id. at 231.
420 [Vol 8:403
2011] THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
its independence in assessing the constitutionality of legislative enactments, it fails
to serve as a check on majoritarian impulses. In the Eighth Amendment context,
which most directly concerns the rights of unpopular individuals, the Court's
refusal is especially troubling. By downplaying the significance of its own
judgment, and rendering decisions in terms of the quantifiable metrics of
contemporary values, the Court has mistaken acquiescence for humility. By
contriving to avail itself of the majoritarian legitimacy of representative
institutions, it has neglected its distinctive constitutional role to render independent
judgment. Finally, by issuing opinions that fail adequately to justify the decisions
it reaches, it has undermined its own political legitimacy.
IV. REVIVING "EVOLVING STANDARDS"
Given that the evolving standards test has led the Court astray, generating an
incoherent and illegitimate Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, perhaps it should
now be abandoned. Indeed, despite the many issues that divide critics of the
Court's doctrine, the one point of agreement seems to be shared contempt for the
evolving standards test.9 7 Under these circumstances, why not jettison "evolving
standards" in favor of a new approach unburdened by so much philosophical
confusion?
Apart from the familiar difficulties associated with the wholesale rejection of
well-established precedent, the "evolving standards of decency" formulation is
worth preserving because it highlights important moral and political values that
belong at the center of Eighth Amendment analysis. The fundamental idea, first
articulated in Weems and Trop, is that mature civilizations eschew gratuitous
brutality because it is inconsistent with respect for human dignity." In this way,
evolving standards captures the values instantiated in the Eighth Amendment,
requiring the Court to develop and defend a contemporary account of decent
treatment that keeps faith with the progressive spirit of the constitutional
enterprise.
With this in mind, we are now in a position to consider an alternative to the
crude majoritarianism of the Court's "objective" analysis and the illegitimacy of
the subjective-preferences approach. The way forward lies in an analysis of Eighth
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and
the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors, which the arts of designing
men or the influence of particular conjunctures sometimes disseminate among the people
themselves; and which, though they speedily give place to better information and more
deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous
innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the
community.
Id.
9 See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 76, at 46-47; Hurd, supra note 16, at 352-53; Lain, supra
note 16, at 661-62; Moore, supra note 58, at 58; Stinneford, supra note 13, at 1755-56.
9 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 381
(1910).
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Amendment concepts-dignity, cruelty, and decency-in terms of our political
morality. To that end, I begin by developing a general account of the familiar
values and commitments that constitute our political morality, highlighting both
substantive and procedural features that reflect the distinctive principles of liberal
democracy. I then sketch the political morality of the Eighth Amendment-the
interplay between these broader commitments and the specific values embodied in
the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Although the resulting
framework will not by itself resolve the various controversies concerning our
punitive institutions and practices, it should direct our attention to the relevant
considerations.
A. Political Morality
"Political morality" refers to the "set of distinct political principles [that
apply] specifically to the use of [state] power."99  It embodies the moral
convictions and commitments that, when all goes well, govern decisions of law
and policy in the public sphere. In this sense, political morality is the collective
analog of personal morality-the system of values meant to shape and constrain
our treatment and expectations of others. Like personal morality, political morality
is inherently controversial. Although it is embodied in our traditions, institutions,
and authoritative political documents, we regularly confront conflicting
interpretations of its meaning and implications.
By way of illustration, consider the value of equality. Explicitly enshrined in
(at least) the Declaration of Independence and the Fourteenth Amendment,
equality is doubtless a basic principle of our political morality. But beyond that
observation, almost everything about equality is controversial. Does it require or
forbid wealth redistribution? Does it apply only to treatment at the hands of
government or to relations among private citizens as well? Does it permit
affirmative action as a race-conscious remedy or forbid it in favor of a colorblind
ideal? What about segregation or gay marriage? In addressing these
controversies, we will get little help from the dictionary or other accounts that
purport to supply a singular definition. Instead, we will have to grapple with
competing interpretations of equality to identify the one that best accords with our
other commitments and values.'0
It might be objected that this complicated interpretive approach would be
unnecessary if we simply insisted that judges and others interpret and apply
constitutional provisions according to a neutral approach, such as originalism or
9 RICHARD VERNON, POLITICAL MoRAUTY: A THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 35 (2001).
' For good discussions of this process of reconciliation, see JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 18-19 (rev. ed. 1999) (describing the process of reflective equilibrium); Norman Daniels,
Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics, 76 J. PHiLOSOPHY 256 (1979); Joel
Feinberg, Justice, Fairness and Rationality, 81 YALE L.J. 1004 (1972). For an attempt to apply these
insights to the justification of punishment, see Mary Sigler, The Methodology of Desert, 42 ARIz. ST.
L.J. 1173 (2011).
[Vol 8:403422
2011] THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF THE EIGHTHAMENDMENT
plain meaning. It is important to see that any claim along these lines is itself an
exercise in interpretive political morality, offering a rival account of constitutional
meaning with reference to a distinct set (or hierarchy) of political values. As a
result, these alternatives do not displace the enterprise of interpretive political
morality; they join the fray as competitors. Moreover, none can claim the mantle
of neutrality, for each reflects a competing arrangement of political values-about
the relative importance of majoritarianism, the role of the judiciary, and the nature
of limited government, for example-that must be articulated and defended as an
aspect of political morality.''
In the face of this daunting challenge, perhaps the Court can be forgiven for
defaulting to majoritarian considerations, which undoubtedly occupy an important
place in our political morality. In a variety of settings, including Supreme Court
decision making, "majority rules" is a venerable decision procedure that
"instantiates one straightforward understanding of the principle of political
equality: equal votes for equal people and the greatest number wins." 0 2  As
already suggested, however, to rely on majoritarianism as a proxy for
constitutional meaning is to succumb to the dark forces of moral skepticism,
rejecting the possibility of objective moral judgment and repudiating key aspects
of our political morality.'0o
Despite persistent controversy about the meaning and application of our
political morality, a number of basic values are reasonably well settled. The
starting point is the familiar set of liberal-democratic premises that inform our
legal and political institutions and practices.'0" On this account, individuals are
naturally free and equal and endowed with rationality and a bundle of inalienable
rights. As such, legitimate state power is exercised on the basis of consent to
secure individual rights and liberties through the mechanisms of self-government
and the rule of law. The commitment to self-government ensures people a say in
establishing and enforcing the laws that bind them, while the rule of law constrains
101 See DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 6-11, 31-43.
102 Stephen Macedo, Against Majoritarianism: Democratic Values and Institutional Design,
90 B.U. L. REv. 1029, 1032 (2010); see also Jeremy Waldron, A Majority in the Lifeboat, 90 B.U. L.
REV. 1043, 1055 (2010) ("Now it is well-known, as a matter of decision-theory, that the principle of
majority-decision and only the principle of majority-decision satisfies" the requirements of equality
and fairness.).
103 See discussion supra Part IlB. The Framers did not conceive of morality in conventional
terms, nor, as a general matter, has the judiciary. See, e.g., WITE, supra note 86, at 216.
For [the Founders], the proposition that all men had a right to life, liberty, religious
freedom, and even the pursuit of happiness could be discovered by Locke's rationalistic
method of discovering the laws of nature, whereas the proposition that some course of
action was in the interest of the whole community could only be discovered by
experience or experiment.
Id. See also Moore, supra note 58, at 52.
104 This basic outline of liberal values is drawn from Locke's influential defense. See
generally JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 269-78, 347-53 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1960).
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arbitrary and unreasonable manifestations of collective power. Further, because
individuals are possessed of equal moral worth, a status inherent in their humanity,
their interests must be taken account of in collective decision making. "Respect
for persons is one of the basic tenets of liberal[-]democratic societies, which are
founded on the ideal of the equal dignity of all citizens and which realize this ideal
in the equalization of rights and entitlements among all citizens." 0 5
Attention to the principles that underlie public decisions is also essential to
democratic legitimacy. For in a liberal-democratic society, the "exercise of
political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in
accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably
be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as
reasonable and rational."106 Thus, the power ofjudicial review imposes on courts a
special obligation "to explain and justify their decisions as based on their
understanding of the constitution and relevant statutes and precedents."10 7 When
judges act without publicly accessible reasons, their conduct is, to that extent,
illegitimate.10 8
B. Political Morality of the Eighth Amendment
In the context of the Eighth Amendment, the values highlighted by the
"evolving standards of decency" formulation both reflect and focus our political
morality. At the core of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment lies
the recognition of human dignity as a normative status that does not depend on
individual achievement or character but attaches to our humanity as such. 09
Indeed, "the idea of respect to humans is most needed when they are not innocent"
or otherwise apparently deserving of concern and respect."i0 For "the fundamental
premise of the Clause [is] that even the vilest criminal remains a human being
possessed of common human dignity.""' In this way, the rejection of cruelty and
the commitment to decency point to a progressive standard that ensures "respect
for [criminals'] intrinsic worth as human beings."ll 2
Of course, the textual focus of the Eighth Amendment is the prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment. Cruelty consists of "the willful inflicting of
1os Robin S. Dillon, Respect, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, 25 (last modified Jun.
21, 2010), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/respect/.
10 RAWLS, supra note 75, at 217.
107 Id. at 216.
108 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 248-53 (1977).
' Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) ("The basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.").
110 Avishai Margalit, Human Dignity Between Kitsch and Deification, 4,
http://www.filosoficas.unam.mx lact_acad/simposio/AMargalit.pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2011).
"' Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 273 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
1 Id. at 270.
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physical pain on a weaker being in order to cause anguish and fear."" 3 It involves
indifference to, or positive pleasure in, the infliction of suffering on another. In the
context of punishment, the infliction of suffering is at least part of the legitimate
point, but the gratuitous infliction of suffering-beyond what is necessary or
deserved--distinguishes the realm of cruelty. The prohibition on cruelty in
punishment thus applies not only to treatment that is inherently barbaric, but also
to sentences that are disproportionate to the crime.1 4 Punishment that is cruel in
either sense reflects an abuse of collective power and is inconsistent with the
respect for human dignity that the liberal-democratic state presupposes.
As an interpretation of the prohibition on cruelty, the evolving standards test
is formulated in terms of a positive commitment to the standards of decency that
distinguish a civilized society."' Decency is an aretaic concept that falls
somewhere on the scale of excellence between virtuousness and viciousness." 6
Although it conveys a generally positive moral judgment, it does not set an
especially demanding standard; when met, it merits only minimal praise.'"7  A
state's commitment to decency involves consideration for the basic human needs
of individuals-those necessities they require "just by virtue of being human." 1 18
In addition to the physical aspects of individual well-being, such as personal health
and safety, the commitment to decency includes a psychological dimension as
well. Thus, as a general matter, it is indecent to subject individuals to humiliation
or other threats to their self-respect." 9
In the domain of punishment, however, some degree of physical discomfort
and social dishonor is a deliberate feature of criminal sanctions. Indeed, "[tlo the
extent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the
penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society." 20
Moreover, punishment is inherently stigmatizing, conveying society's moral
condemnation of an offender's criminal conduct.121 But while punishment is
"' Judith N. Shklar, Putting Cruelty First, DAEDALUS, Summer 1982, at 17.
114 See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910).
1s See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
116 Johan Brinnmark, From Virtue to Decency, 37 METAPHILOSOPHY 589, 595 (2006).
117 Mathias Risse, The Morally Decent Person, 38 S.J. PHILOSOPHY 263, 266 (2000).
118 Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 881, 921 (2009).
119 AVISHAI MARGALYT, THE DECENT SOCIETY, at 1 (Naomi Goldblum trans., 1996). The
extremely torturous punishments of the premodern period involved not only physical brutality but
humiliation as well. See id. at 263.
120 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
121 R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND CoMMuNITY, at xv (2001); Joel Feinberg,
The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397, 401 (1965); MARGALIT, supra note 119, at
269; Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 591, 599 (1996).
One need not believe that the purpose of punishment is expressive to accept that conviction and
punishment for a criminal offense expresses moral condemnation. See ANDREW VON HIRSCH,
CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 9 (1993).
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necessarily unpleasant and dishonorable in these ways, the commitment to decency
requires that it "must be kept entirely free of any maltreatment that would make an
abomination of the humanity residing in the person suffering it."l 22  The
commitment to decency is thus inconsistent with gratuitously harsh or excessive
punishments or conditions that fail to meet offenders' basic human needs.123 For
"[a] decent society cares about the dignity of its prisoners."l 2 4
The final dimension of evolving standards concerns the progressive spirit of
the Eighth Amendment protection. According to the Trop Court's formulation, the
controlling standards of decency are those that "mark the progress of a maturing
society."l25 The point is not only that mature civilizations have become
progressively less violent, though they certainly have; 126 rather, it is that these
developments are at least partly what maturity consists in. That is, evolving
standards, properly understood, involves a normative, not an empirical, inquiry; it
does not depend on prevailing public sentiment or trends in state practice. It is for
this reason that we need not be overly troubled by the possibility that "evolving
standards" might eventually lead us back to the gruesome forms of medieval
punishment the Framers specifically had in mind when they adopted the Eighth
Amendment. 127  Although such a development is not impossible, it is quite
unlikely, for it would have to be reconciled with the rejection of cruelty and the
commitment to decency as these have come to be understood. So while we cannot
rule out the possibility that the Court will one day sanction the rack and the
breaking wheel in the name of "evolving standards," it seems about as likely as the
possibility that in the domain of human origins we will come to reject evolutionary
theory in favor of creationism. Knowing what we now know, it is practically
inconceivable.128
122 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE § 333, at 102 (John Ladd
trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1965) (1797).
123 See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994) (disapproving of "denying humane
conditions of confinement" under the Eighth Amendment if there is "substantial risk of serious harm"
which is disregarded); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (holding that denying prisoner
medical needs constituted "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" that is prohibited under the
Eighth Amendment).
124 MARGALIT, supra note 119, at 270.
125 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
126 See Steven Pinker, A History of Violence: We're Getting Nicer Every Day, NEW REPUBLIC,
Mar. 19, 2007, at 18 (tracing the decline of violence throughout the history of humankind).
127 See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 76, at 145 (expressing concern that an evolving interpretation
of the Eighth Amendment "would be no protection against the moral perceptions of a fiture, more
brutal, generation").
128 This is not to say that the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence can never be expected
to develop in the direction of greater or more severe punishments. My own view is that at least some
of the Court's recent death penalty decisions, such as those exempting teenagers and rapists who do
not kill their victims, are not well reasoned. It is thus possible that a more carefil analysis of the
relevant considerations might warrant a reversal of these decisions. Of course, this development
would not represent the descent into barbarity that concerns Justice Scalia.
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These considerations suggest the general contours of a revamped Eighth
Amendment analysis. As an initial matter, the Court should pay serious attention
to the justifications for punishment. In particular, it must develop, as it so far has
not, a coherent account of the relevant justifications as a basis for evaluating a
state's proffered rationale.129 It must also assess the compatibility of the various
justifications with one another and gauge the proportionality between crime and
punishment in light of the relevant justifications.130  This does not mean that the
Court would have to conduct independent factual inquiries to determine the
effectiveness of, say, deterrence, but it might require a state to do so as a basis for
adopting deterrence as a penal justification. At a minimum, it seems reasonable to
expect greater conceptual clarity as an aspect of meaningful constitutional
analysis.' 3'
The Court's track record of evaluating, or even articulating, the retributive
rationale is especially poor, however. Although, as a general matter, the institution
of liberal punishment seems incomprehensible without reference to such
retributive values as desert and proportionality,132 the Court has been unable to
consistently distinguish retribution from less savory accounts of punishment,
including revenge and the need to forestall vigilantism.13 3 As a result, it has not
129 See generally Mary Sigler, Contradiction, Coherence, and Guided Discretion in the
Supreme Court's Capital Sentencing Jurisprudence, 40 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 1151 (2003) (detailing the
Court's confusing and inconsistent characterizations of the justifications for punishment).
130 At least since Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), the Court has generally not
engaged in meaningful proportionality review, especially outside the death penalty context. In
Harmelin, the Court concluded that "the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee."
Id. at 965. In at least some cases, however, the Court has invalidated sentences based upon a finding
of disproportionality. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008); Solem v. Helm, 463
U.S. 277 (1983); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
131 See H.L.A. HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 2-3 (2d ed. 2008).
Yet what is said in public debates about punishment by those specially concerned with it
as judges or legislators is important. Few are likely to be more circumspect, and if what
they say seems, as it often does, unclear, one-sided[,] and easily refutable ... it is likely
that in our inherited ways of talking or thinking about punishment there is some persistent
drive towards an over-simplification of multiple issues which require separate
consideration.
Id.
132 See Hugo Adam Bedau & Erin Kelly, Punishment, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (last modified Feb. 19, 2010), http://plato.stanford.edulentries/punishment/.
1 See Sigler, supra note 129, at 1178-83 (documenting Supreme Court justices' conflation of
retribution with various consequentialist rationales). In its recent decision invalidating the death
penalty for non-fatal child rape, the Court's opinion reflects the familiar confusion about the
retributive rationale. Worrying that retribution "most often can contradict the law's own ends," the
Court insists that "[w]hen the law punishes by death, it risks its own sudden descent into brutality,
transgressing the constitutional commitment to decency and restraint." Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2650.
I honestly have no idea what this means. The Court has consistently held that the death penalty is not
per se unconstitutional, that retribution is a legitimate justification for punishment, and that
retribution is grounded in moral culpability. It is unclear, then, what "ends" of the law retribution
threatens or why capital punishment presents a special risk of a "sudden descent into brutality."
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given adequate consideration to the case for retribution-the idea of punishment as
intrinsically valuable regardless of whether it promotes (or undermines) other
penal values. In Kennedy, for example, in which the Court categorically rejected
capital punishment for the non-fatal rape of a child, its muddled analysis
"conceptually contemplates the possibility that disproportionate punishment could
be compatible with retribution; and as such, it literally makes no sense."l34
To be sure, because retribution is a non-consequentialist rationale, it presents
special interpretive challenges regarding desert and proportionality. In the death
penalty context, for example, both opponents and advocates invoke the
commitment to human dignity as grounds for their position. For those who oppose
capital punishment, execution under any circumstances fails to respect the inherent
dignity of the person. "The calculated killing of a human being by the State
involves, by its very nature, a denial of the executed person's humanity."' For
others, however, capital punishment is the only penalty that truly respects the
murderer's humanity. As Kant argued, the principle of "equality" requires that
punishment match as closely as possible the offense itself.'36  In the case of a
murderer, then, "he must die." 37 For "[t]here is no sameness of kind between
death and remaining alive even under the most miserable conditions .... As
this example suggests, desert judgments are inherently controversial, and no data
or metric can definitively establish the type or amount of punishment particular
offenders deserve.
A more robust analysis of cruelty and decency could lead to other
improvements in Eighth Amendment analysis as well. First, a serious commitment
to the decent treatment of criminal offenders might result in greater judicial
responsiveness to the dangerous and degrading conditions that prevail in many
American prisons and jails.'39 Although the Court has already recognized that the
State has an Eighth Amendment responsibility to ensure the health and safety of
134 Hurd, supra note 16, at 357.
1s Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 290 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
136 KANT, supra note 122, at 102.
137 id
138 Id.; see also Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475 (1968). Morris
defends a "right to be punished," id. at 475-76, which follows from taking ourselves seriously as
moral agents. "We treat a human being as a person provided: first, we permit the person to make the
choices that will determine what happens to him and second, when our responses to the person are
responses respecting the person's choices." Id. at 492. Despite the oddity of a right to something that
most people do not want-punishment-Morris argues that the denial of this right entails the denial
of all of our rights. For "any framework of rights and duties presupposes individuals that have the
capacity to choose on the basis of reasons presented to them, and that what makes legitimate actions
within such a system are the free choices of individuals." Id. at 499. Morris, however, did not
specifically address the issue of capital punishment.
'3 See generally Dolovich, supra note 118; Mary Sigler, By the Light of Virtue: Prison Rape
and the Corruption of Character, 91 IOwA L. REv. 561 (2006).
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inmates in its care,' 0 it has developed standards of liability that leave inmates
vulnerable to all but the most egregious forms of official malfeasance. 141
Similarly, serious attention to the meaning of cruelty might justify a greater
role for proportionality review outside the high-stakes context of life-and-death
sentencing. In these latter cases, the Court has recognized that a punishment is
excessive "if it (1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of
punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless
imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity
of the crime."l42 In this way, the Court acknowledges that it "is an established
principle that decency, in its essence, presumes respect for the individual and thus
moderation or restraint in the application of capital punishment."4 3 Unfortunately,
despite the absence of any justification for restricting this principle to capital
punishment, the Court has long since abandoned the project of meaningful
proportionality review outside the context of life-and-death punishments.'"
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's reliance on the "evolving standards of decency" has
produced confusion and cynicism in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Although
the recent trend away from the harshest punishments for certain offenders and
offenses brings the United States more in line with other Western industrial
democracies, the decisions themselves lack systematic engagement with the
relevant legal, moral, and political values that could inform a judgment about
whether the Court has reached the correct results. Instead, moved by an
indeterminate mix of majoritarian and public policy considerations, the Court
lurches along without apparent aim or justification.
An Eighth Amendment analysis grounded in our political morality offers the
prospect of greater justice, coherence, and legitimacy in judicial decision
making-but no greater certainty about particular legal outcomes. Thus, there is
reason to believe that decoupling Eighth Amendment interpretation from
majoritarian preferences would better safeguard the rights of society's most
unpopular individuals, that our punitive institutions and practices would more
consistently reflect the relevant justifications of punishment, and that an
articulation of the moral foundations of the Court's decisions might enhance rather
'" Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
141 See Fanner, 511 U.S. at 837; Dolovich, supra note 118, at 946; Sigler, supra note 139, at
590.
142 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
143 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2658 (2008).
'" Compare Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983) ("The final clause [of the Eighth
Amendment] prohibits not only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to
the crime committed.") with Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991) ("[T]he Eighth
Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee.").
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than threaten its institutional legitimacy. But it remains to be seen whether the
political morality alternative to Eighth Amendment interpretation would produce
substantive decisions different from those the Court has reached under the
prevailing approach-whether the death penalty would apply more or less broadly
or not at all, whether three strikes laws and other recidivism enhancements could
withstand meaningful proportionality review, whether minors and other offenders
with mental deficits should be entitled to categorical exclusion from the most
severe punishments. In all of these cases, controversy is inevitable, but decisions
articulated in terms of our political morality would help to define the parameters of
reasonable debate.
